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NOTES
DISCOVERY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS AND THE NEW "QUALIFIED"
PRIVILEGES
Federal income tax returns contain a variety of information
potentially useful to a taxpayer's adversary in civil litigation. A
taxpayer's federal return must list his income "from whatever source
derived"' and typically contains information about the taxpayer's
marital status, dependents, business dealings, investments, religious
affiliations, charitable inclinations, property holdings, and debt
obligations.2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for
discovery of nonprivileged documents "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence," even if the documents
themselves would not be admissible.3 The discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules are to be read liberally and in favor of broad pretrial
discovery.4 Nevertheless, a taxpayer may have formed an expectation
that the personal information required on his return will remain
i. I.R.C. § 61 (1982).
2. An individual income tax return may contain an immense amount of information
about its filer. By the time he answers the first seven questions on the form, the taxpayer
has identified himself and his address, social security number, marital status, and
children or other dependents. By responding to the next eight questions, he exposes his
entire gross income for the year, at least in summary form. Before he has completed the
first half of the first page of Form 1040, he has revealed the skeletal outline of his
personal and financial life.
The more attachments he affixes, the more vulnerable he becomes. There is likely to
be a W-2 form, through which others may discover vital facts about his employment. By
reviewing Schedule A to Form 1040, a reader may learn whether the taxpayer or his
family are [sic] under medical and psychiatric care. It also may reveal the filer's religious
affiliation, the objects and degree of his eleemosynary inclinations, the sources of his
borrowed money, his union membership, his political leanings, and many other facets of
his personal and private life.
A close reading of Schedule B in conjunction with proper financial publications
may reveal an entire investment portfolio-not just its general content, but the taxpayer's
precise holdings.
REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TO THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 827-28 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT].
3. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
4. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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private.5 Discovery of federal income tax returns,6 therefore, involves
a conflict between the taxpayer's privacy expectations and the policy
favoring broad civil discovery.
No statute or regulation resolves this conflict. Sections 6103 and
7213 of the Internal Revenue Code,7 which pertain to the
confidentiality of taxpayer filings, have generally been interpreted not
to confer a privilege upon tax returns and return information in the
possession of the taxpayer. 8 Moreover, neither the Privacy Act of 19749
nor the Tax Reform Act of 197610 limited discovery of tax return
information by a taxpayer's opponent in a civil suit." Notwithstanding
5. ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 328-29.
6. "Return" and "return information" are given a technical meaning at I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1)-
(2) (1982). Benedict & Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns-The Tension Between Government
A4ccess and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 940, 950 n.53 (1979); see generally Corey,
Confidentiality of Tax Returns, 36 ANNUAL N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1265, 1269-
72 (1978).
7. The "general rule" is that "returns and return information shall be confidential, and
except as authorized by this title-(I) no officer or employee of the United States, [and] (2) no
officer or employee of any State ... shall disclose any return or return information obtained by
him in any manner .. " I.R.C. § 6103(a). The exceptions to the general rule permit disclosure
of returns and return information to such persons as the taxpayer may designate in writing, I.R.C.
§ 6103(c), to the taxpayer himself, I.R.C. § 6103(e)(l)(A)(i), to his spouse on stated conditions,
I.R.C. § 6103(e)(l)(A)(iii), to either party to a joint return, I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(B), to a partner
(with respect to a partnership return), I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(C), to any person designated by
resolution of the board of directors, a corporate officer in stated circumstances, or a bona fide
shareholder of more than one percent of the corporation's stock in stated circumstances (with
respect to a corporate return), I.R.C. § 6103(e)(l)(D)(i), (ii), (iii), to a trustee, executor or
beneficiary, in stated circumstances (with respect to the return of a trust or estate), I.R.C.
§ 6103(e)(1)(E), (F), and, upon court order, to federal officers and employees undertaking nontax
federal criminal investigations, I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(A).
Provisions penalizing violations of Section 6103 are found at I.R.C. § 7213 (1982). Solicitors
and publishers of unlawful disclosures are subject to fines not exceeding $5000 and terms of
imprisonment not exceeding five years, plus costs of prosecution. Id § 7213(a)(3), (4).
8. E.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 219 (1961); Premium Serv. Corp.
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1975); Eastern Auto Distribs., Inc. v.
Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982); Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W.
R.R., 20 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 1 F.R.D. 190, 192 (D. Conn. 1940) (construing § 55 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
which is the predecessor of the current § 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). Contra
Austin v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 15 F.R.D. 490, 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1954); O'Connell v. Olsen &
Ugelstadt, 10 F.R.D. 142, 143 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
10. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1667-87 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7213 (1982)).
11. The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits the federal government from disclosing information
about an individual without his consent. The Act, however, specifically exempts disclosure which
would be "pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(l 1).
See Benedict & Lupert, supra note 6, at 949. ("While tax returns appear to be covered by the
Privacy Act, the Act's broad exceptions negate any practical effect.").
The Senate Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1976 stated that "[b]y this
amendment, the Committee does not itnend [sic] to limit the right of an agency (or otherpary) to
obtain returns or return information directly from the taxpayer through the applicable discovery
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the absence of any express congressional or administrative 2 mandate
to limit discovery of tax returns, however, some courts have developed
a "qualified" tax return privilege.' 3
This note first discusses the judicial development of a "qualified"
privilege for tax returns.' 4 The two policy foundations for the privilege
are (a) protecting taxpayer privacy, and (b) encouraging the filing of
full and accurate tax returns, in compliance with federal law.' 5 The
note then discusses the general doctrine of "qualified" privileges that is
emerging in federal courts.16 The emerging "qualified" privileges
typically relieve the party opposing discovery of his initial burden of
showing good cause why discovery should be denied. Moreover, it
places upon the party seeking discovery a burden of showing the
relevance of the information sought and the absence of alternative
means of discovery. The note' argues that courts should use the
standard governing the creation of the traditional "absolute" privileges
to determine whether to recognize a claim of "qualified" privilege. 17
The note then critically analyzes the "qualified" tax return privilege
according to the traditional standard. 18
The policy of encouraging taxpayer compliance, which many
courts advance in support of the "qualified" tax return privilege,
procedures." S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 331, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3439, 3761 (emphasis added). See also Corey, supra note 6, at 1299-1300 (confidentiality
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code do not prohibit the obtaining of returns and return
information directly from the taxpayer). The cases are in agreement. See Credit Life Ins, Co. v.
Uniworld Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 113, 119 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (legislative history of the 1976 Tax
Reform Act does not indicate that Congress considered according absolute privilege to tax
returns); Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 233-34 (D.D.C. 1978) (the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 "only restricts the dissemination of tax returns by the government ...
copies in the hands of a taxpayer" are discoverable); But cf. Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 469
nA (D.D.C. 1977) ("Nothing in the 1976 amendments to the tax code diminishes the confidential
nature of federal tax returns. In fact, the opposite appears true.").
12. Treasury regulations provide that disclosure of tax return information to the designee of
the taxpayer "shall not be made ... if the Service determines that the disclosure would seriously
impair Federal tax administration." Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(c)-1(c) (1984). There is no analogous
restriction where the taxpayer requests a copy for his own use. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(l)(A)(i) (1982).
The courts that order discovery of tax return information typically require the taxpayer to obtain a
copy of his return from the IRS-if he has not retained one-and then to make that copy
available to his adversary. Eg., Reeves v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 107, 108-09 (D.
Del. 1948).
13. The term "qual#Fed" privilege was first applied to discovery of income tax returns in
Eastern Auto Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982).
14. See infra notes 26-64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 109-39 and accompanying text.
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embodies two distinct concerns.' 9 The first, that of encouraging full
and accurate reporting of tax deductions, is found not to be in need of
judicial assistance.20 The second, that of encouraging full and accurate
reporting of income, is found to derive from what many courts regard
as a national policy of maximizing federal revenues.2' The note argues
that the policy of maximizing federal revenue cannot be served to any
significant degree by a "qualified" tax return privilege.22
The policy of guarding taxpayer privacy, which some courts
invoke to justify a "qualified" privilege, is shown not to justify special
treatment of tax returns as against other financial information.23
Taxpayer privacy is, moreover, shown to be sufficiently well protected
from discovery abuse by the standard structure of Rule 26.24 The note
concludes that a "qualified" privilege for tax returns is an unjustified
departure from the norms of discovery under the federal rules. 25
I. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE "QUALIFIED" PRIVILEGE FOR
FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS
A. The Early Cases.
Section 6103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that tax
returns and return information "shall be confidential. ' 26 The early
cases were divided in their application of section 610327 to civil discov-
ery of tax returns. In Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 28 the court held that nothing in section 6103 or the regulations
issued under it "precludes a court of competent jurisdiction from re-
quiring a disclosure of a tax return by the taxpayer in connection with
civil litigation to which the taxpayer is a party."' 29 Precisely the oppo-
site conclusion was reached, however, by the court in O'Connell v. Ol-
sen & Ugelstadt,30 which held that until Congress or the Treasury
provided otherwise, tax returns would be immune from civil discov-
ery. 31 Although the Connecticut Importing view of section 6103 gained
19. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
25. See infra text following note 139.
26. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1982).
27. Section 55 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was the predecessor of the current
§ 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
28. 1 F.R.D. 190 (D. Conn. 1940).
29. Id at 192.
30. 10 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
31. Id at 142.
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the support of most courts, 32 O'Connellhad at least one follower, 33 and
other courts denied discovery of tax returns on grounds other than stat-
utory privilege, chiefly, for failure to show "good cause," which until
1970 was required to be shown by the movant for an order to compel
discovery.34 In denying motions to compel discovery, courts have
noted that the information was available from alternative sources 35 or
by the "intelligent use" of other discovery devices, 36 or that the infor-
mation was of doubtful relevance. 37 By the time the inapplicability of
section 6103 to private litigants was finally settled by the Supreme
Court's dictum in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States,38 a doctrine of
"qualified" privilege had taken hold independently of any supposed
statutory basis.
32. See, eg., The Sultana, 77 F. Supp. 287, 288 (W.D.N.Y. 1948); Reeves v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D. Del. 1948).
33. Austin v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 15 F.R.D. 490, 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1954).
34. It could be argued that the new "qualified" privileges that are increasingly appearing in
federal practice are but a recrudescence of the old, discredited "gocd cause" requirement. See
generalf FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee notes; infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
35. See Welty v. Clute, 2 F.R.D. 429,430 (W.D.N.Y. 1939) (motion to compel production of
income tax returns denied; finding that that books and records required to be produced reveal
income so far as relevant).
36. O'Connell v. Olsen & Ugelstadt, 10 F.R.D. at 143.
37. Richland Wholesale Liquors v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 40 F.R.D. 480, 483 (D.S.C.
1966).
38. 368 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1961). Compare that section of the Code which deals with disclo-
sure of tax return information in a state or federal judicial or administrative tax proceeding, and
limits disclosure
[t]o the extent required by an order of a court pursuant to section 3500 of title 18, United
States Code, or Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, such court being
authorized in the issuance of such order to give due consideration to congressionalpolicy
favoring the confidentiality of returns and return information as setforth in this title.
I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(D) (1982) (emphasis added). It could be argued that the dictum in St. Regis
did not insulate the conduct of discovery in private civil litigation from the reach of this confiden-
tiality policy. Such an argument has, however, several weaknesses. The St. Regis court, though in
dictum, stated that the language of section 6103 had no application to discovery in private litiga-
tion. Second, section 6103(h)(4)(D) applies to disclosure in judicial and administrative tax pro-
ceedings. No wider application appears to have been intended. Third, Congress quickly reacted to
the St. Regis decision, as it pertained to census reports, by creating an absolute "census report"
privilege. Act of Oct. 15, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-813, 76 Stat. 922, 922 (codified at 13 U.S.C. § 9
(1982)); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 648 (D.D.C. 1979).
Congress has not amended the relevant portions of the Internal Revenue Code, although
it has been afforded many opportunities to do so.... Given the decision in St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States and the repeated failure of Congress to alter the discoverable
status of tax returns, as observed in that case... the conclusion must be drawn that...
tax returns are subject to discovery in civil litigation between private parties.
Credit Life Ins. Co. v. Uniworld Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 113, 119 (S.D. Ohio 1982); accordMaggio v.
Hynes, 423 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (Congress has not acted to disturb decisions expos-
ing tax returns to discovery by private litigants); cf. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S.
Ct. 1495, 1501 (1984) (tax accrual workpapers prepared by independent auditor are discoverable
under Rule 26(b)(1) by private plaintiff in securities litigation).
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B. The Kingsley Rule.
The first case to establish a "qualified" tax return privilege without
invoking explicit statutory authority was Kingsley v. Delaware, Lack-
awanna & Western Railroad3 9 In Kingsley, decided four years before
St. Regis, the defendant moved to compel production of the plaintiff's
tax returns in a suit for recovery of lost earnings. The court noted the
disarray of the earlier cases, criticized O'Connell for reading a non-
waivable privilege into section 6103,40 and concluded that the "better
reasoned view" was that "where a litigant himself tenders an issue as to
the amount of his income, there is no privilege against the disclosure of
his tax returns. '41 The court found that disclosure under these circum-
stances was consistent with section 6103 because "the purpose of the
statute is to prevent the disclosure of confidential information to those
who do not have a legitimate interest in it."42 By bringing suit upon a
claim of lost earnings, the taxpayer had given his adversary a "legiti-
mate interest" in his income and thus waived a privilege he would
otherwise have enjoyed.4 3
Although some courts have applied the Kingsley rule without mod-
ification, 4 others-faced with more complicated facts-have made ad-
justments. In Shaver v. Yacht Outward Bound,5 the court invoked the
Kingsley rule46 even though the plaintiff had not directly made his in-
come an issue. The plaintiff in Shaver had been injured while a guest
on a yacht, and sought its owner's federal tax return to discover
whether the expenses of maintaining the boat were claimed as business
deductions. The plaintiff hoped to show that the owner's employer
could be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. In ordering the
39. 20 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
40. Id at 159.
41. Id at 158.
42. Id
43. Not all commentators read Kingsley as a "waiver" case. Compare Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HaRv. L. Rav. 940, loll & n.558 (1961) (waiver) with Conklin, Income Tax
Returns and the Federal Rules, in TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 1, 5 (J. Kennelly ed. 1982) (relevance).
Kingsley both rejects and embraces the assumption that privilege law applies to tax returns. Un-
less he has been misunderstood, Judge Bryan argued both that no privilege existed and that it had
been waived. Cases following Kingsley agreed that there was no "absolute" privilege but seemed
to find the language of privilege a convenient shorthand for a variety of disconnected concerns
that needed to be addressed before discovery would be allowed.
44. See, e.g., Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kreuger, 55 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
("It is the opinion of this court that the case of Kingsley. . . represents the best view."); Wiesen-
berger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ("income tax returns should be
ordered produced 'where a litigant himself tenders an issue as to the amount of damages' ").
45. 71 F.R.D. 561 (E.D. Ill. 1976).
46. Id at 563. The court does not cite Kingsley but rather Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Kreuger, 55 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1972), which adopts Kingsley.
Vol. 1984:938]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
production of the tax return, the court modified the Kingsley rule in two
ways. First, the court held that the party resisting discovery cannot
claim a privilege if his returns would "cast significant light"47 on issues
he raised. Second, by holding that the taxpayer waives his privilege if
tax return information is relevant to any factual issue "raised by his
denials,"48 the court, in effect, required the taxpayer to admit to those
of his adversary's pleadings to which his tax returns may be relevant or
else risk waiver.
C. The Cooper Rule.
The second important "qualified" tax return privilege case was
Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co.49 In Cooper, a securities fraud case, the
plaintiff sought a protective order denying the defendant access to his
tax returns, which the defendant argued would show that the plaintiff's
motivation in investing was to shelter income. In its analysis, the court
applied a rule quite different from that of the Kingsley case. Noting the
conflict between the policies favoring extensive discovery, on the one
hand, and disfavoring disclosure of confidential taxpayer information,
on the other, the court devised a rule intended to put the two in proper
balance: "[T]he production of tax returns should not be ordered unless
it clearly appears they are relevant to the subject matter of the action or
to the issues raised thereunder, and further, that there is a compelling
need therefor because the information contained therein is not other-
wise readily obtainable. '50
Later cases have applied this two-part rule, but with differing
thresholds and burdens of proof. In Eastern Auto Distributors v.
Peugeot Motors ofAmerica, Inc.,51 for example, the court required that
47. Shaver, 71 F.R.D. at 564.
48. Id
49. 34 F.R.D. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
50. Id at 484. The rule closely resembles the formulae utilized by courts until 1970 to inter-
pret the showing of "good cause" required of parties seeking discovery under Rule 34. See jipra
note 34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) advisory committee note (1970 amendment). The elimination of
the good cause requirement was undertaken simultaneously with the rearrangement of Rule 26 to
incorporate former Rule 30(b), "changed to give it application to discovery generally." Id It
appears that these amendments were intended to apply the mechanism of Rule 26(c) to all docu-
ments--other than attorney work-product-formerly shielded from discovery by application of
the "good cause" requirement of Rule 34. Accord 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2205 at 602-06 (1970) ("As a result [of the 1970 amendments]. . . docu-
ments that are not trial preparation are freely discoverable under Rule 34.").
Nevertheless, it is also plain that the 1970 amendments were not intended to disapprove spe-
cial treatment of income tax returns under Rule 26(c) when "interests of privacy may call for a
measure of extra protection." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) advisory committee notes (1970 amendments),
51. 96 F.R.D. 147 (1982).
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the party seeking discovery show some, rather than clear, relevance.5 2
The court further held that once the party seeking discovery has made
his showing of relevance, his opponent bears the burden of showing
that the information sought is available from other sources. Should his
opponent meet that burden, discovery will not be ordered unless the
party seeking discovery shows the court that a "good faith" examina-
tion of the alternative sources indicated by his opponent fails to dis-
close the information desired.5 3
D. Other Standards.
Other courts that restrict discovery of tax returns invoke caution-
ary phrases, such as that tax return information ought not be "indis-
criminately disclosed" 54 in civil discovery, or that discovery may be
had in "appropriate circumstance"5 5 but ought not be "routinely re-
quired. '56 Often, the analyses applied in these cases trace the Cooper
or Kingsley rules,57 a variant of one or the other,58 or a combination of
the two.59  Other courts, following Weisenberger v. WE. Hutton &
Co.,60 have held that tax return information is discoverable only where
"clearly required in the interests of justice."'6' This formula has also
been supplemented by other vehicles of analysis,62 but it differs from
other "qualified" tax return privilege standards in that it seems to sanc-
52. Id at 148.
53. Id at 149.
54. Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 469 (D.D.C. 1977).
55. Heathman v. United States Dist. Ct., 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1974).
56. Troglione v. McIntyre Aviation, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 511, 512 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
57. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kreuger, 55 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Il. 1972); Richland
Wholesale Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 40 F.RtD. 480, 483 (D.S.C. 1966) (Cooper
not met, even assuming Kingsley met).
58. See, e.g., Eastern Auto Distribs. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., 96 F.R.D. 147, 148-49 (E.D.
Va. 1982) (discovery may be had in "appropriate circumstances," determined by a variant of the
Cooper test); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Canto, Fitzgerald Sec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 414, 416-17
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (federal policy limits discovery to "appropriate circumstances," but denied on
grounds consistent with Cooper; party seeking discovery failed to show unavailability elsewhere);
Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (returns not "routinely" discoverable, but
party resisting discovery has to have put income in issue, as under Kingsley).
59. See, e.g., Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 79 F.R.D. 72, 80-81
(D.P.R. 1978) (production of returns not to be "routinely required"; factors relevant to both
Cooper and Kingsley lines of analysis are considered); Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 469-70
(D.D.C. 1977) (discovery noted to have been limited to "appropriate circumstances"; both Cooper
and Kingsley-style analyses applied).
60. 35 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
61. Id at 557.
62. SeeTele-Radio Sys., Ltd. v. DeForest Elecs., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 371, 375 (D.N.J. 1981) (dis-
covery of returns not to be ordered unless "clearly required in the interests ofjustice"; discovery
denied on grounds that information was otherwise available and party resisting discovery had not
made income an issue).
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tion an especially restrictive departure from the liberal norms of federal
discovery.
Still other courts63 limit discovery of tax returns upon a showing of
good cause by the party resisting discovery, and then only to protect
that party from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue bur-
den and expense." This approach is essentially that of Rule 26(C).64
E. Policy Rationales Underlying the "Quailed" Tax-Return
Privilege.
Most courts that restrict discovery of federal income tax returns do
so at least in part on policy grounds. The Kingsley6O and Cooper66
opinions advert to a policy against public disclosure of the contents of
tax returns-a policy "underscored" 67 by sections 6103 and 7213 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which penalize government employees for un-
lawful disclosure of tax return information.
Taxpayer privacy68 and protection of business secrets 69 have been
63. See, e.g., Lavin v. Becker, 60 F.R.D. 684, 686 (N.D. IMI. 1973). In this securities case, the
court considered the defendants' motion to compel production of the plaintiffs tax returns. The
court stated that the Federal Rules favor the "broadest possible" discovery, id at 686, and found
that the plaintiff had failed to show that production would be "annoying, burdensome or com-
pletely irrelevant to the thrust of the instant litigation." Id
The facts of Lavin are similar to those of Wesenberger. In Wiesenberger the court took the
position that returns are not to be discovered unless the party seeking discovery is able to show
persuasively that production is "clearly required in the interests of justice." 35 F.R.D. at 557. In
Lavin, the burden was reversed.
64. Rule 26(c) states:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good
cause shown, the court... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, m-
cluding one or more of the following: (I) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the
discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions... ; (4). . that the scope
of discovery be limited to certain matters ... ; (7) that a trade secret or other confiden-
tial. . . commercial information not be discussed.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(c) (emphasis added).
65. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ... protects taxpayers against public disclosure
of the contents of tax returns. This policy is underscoredby the penal provisions of the
Code which make it unlawful for any Federal or State officer or employee to divulge
such matter "in any manner whatever not provided by law."
Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 20 F.R.D. at 158 (emphasis added).
66. "Public policy favors the nondisclosure of income tax returns. Criminal sanctions for
unauthorized disclosure underscore this policy." Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. at 483
(emphasis added).
67. Although Judge Weinfeld, in Cooper, did not cite or acknowledge Judge Bryan's earlier
opinion in Kingsley for the same court, he chose the same term, "underscore," to express the
relation between the policy of nondisclosure and the statutory criminal sanctions. See supra notes
65-66.
68. See, e.g., Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (this "historic trend [away
from routine discovery of tax returns] seems to stem in part from the private nature of the sensitive
information contained therein"); Wiesenberger v. W. E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. at 557 ("People
are normally opposed to the invasion of their privacy by exposure of the details contained in an
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cited as policy grounds for restricting discovery. Taxpayer privacy
seems to be the more compelling of the two considerations. Rule
26(c)(7) specifically provides for a protective order in order "that a
trade secret or other confidential. . . commercial information not be
disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way."'70 Where personal
privacy interests are unjustifiably threatened, however, Rule 26 does
not specify what kind of protective order may be available. Because of
the particularity with which Rule 26 treats business secrets, there is less
need for an independent "qualified" discovery privilege to protect
them.71 This note will examine the policy of taxpayer privacy in
greater detail. 72
In Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Co. v. Kreuger,73 the court
advanced another basis for limiting discovery: a policy "grounded in
the interest of the government in full disclosure of all the taxpayer's
income which thereby maximizes revenue." 74 The court in Payne v.
Howard 5 adopted the dual policy basis of maximizing revenue and
encouraging taxpayers' use of "all of the tax-saving measures to which
they are lawfully entitled. '76 Still other cases speak of a public interest
in promoting the filing of "complete and accurate" returns.77 This note
will examine these policies in greater detail.78
income tax return."). But cf. Heathman v. United States Dist. Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir.
1974) ("Defendants also argue that the discovery of their copies of their tax returns violates their
right of privacy and their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . There is
no merit in these constitutional claims.").
69. In Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975), the
Ninth Circuit upheld the quashing of a subpoena of third-party tax returns in an antitrust suit.
Although the court adduced other grounds, the opinion suggests that it might equally have sus-
tained the quashing for privacy reasons: "The district court could reasonably have found, without
abusing its discretion, that [the plaintiff's] need for these documents was not sufficient to outweigh
the burden and invasion of corporate privacy which would have resulted to [the third parties],
especially since they were not parties to the suit." Id at 229 (emphasis added). In Richland
Wholesale Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 40 F.R.D. 480, 482 (D.S.C. 1966), another
antitrust action, the court equated the discovery of tax returns to "giving a competitor entree into
[an adversary's] business."
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
71. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Rule 26(c)(7) accords trade secrets what
amounts to a "qualified" privilege against discovery. Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443
U.S. 340, 356 (1979).
72. See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
73. 55 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
74. Id at 514.
75. 75 F.R.D. 465 (D.D.C. 1977).
76. Id at 469.
77. See, e.g., Premium Serv. Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir.
1975) ("complete and accurate" returns are needed for tax laws to function properly); Smith v.
Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (reluctance to order routine discovery of tax returns
stems in part from the public interest in filing "complete and accurate returns").
78. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
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II. THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF THE "QUALIFIED" TAX
RETURN PRIVILEGE
A. The New Law of "Qualffed" Privileges.
In 1975, Congress rejected an exclusive list of evidentiary privi-
leges proposed by the Supreme Court, and enacted instead the open-
ended language of Rule 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress ... the privileges of a witness [or]
person shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. 79
Most authorities view Rule 501 as a congressional endorsement of fur-
ther case-by-case development of the federal common law of privi-
lege.80 Because the concept of "privilege" in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is drawn from the law of evidence,81 there is support for the
view that Congress has implicitly endorsed a parallel evolution in the
law of pretrial discovery.8 2
In recent years, federal courts have begun to recognize various
claims of "qualjqed" privilege. The label itself is uninformative and
perhaps misleading, for the issue before these courts has been what
might better be termed a conditional immunity from discovery-no
court has indicated that a "qualified" privilege could be invoked at the
trial.83 Nevertheless, courts have found the term "qualified" privilege
79. FED. R. EvID. 501.
80. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); see also M. GRAHAM, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 295 (1981).
81. According to FED. R. EvID. 1101(c), "[t]he rule with respect to privileges applies at all
stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." Therefore an evidentiary privilege is also a privilege
against discovery. That the converse is true is shown by the opinion in United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953) ("[w]e think it should be clear that the term 'not privileged,' as it is used in
Rule 34, refers to 'privileges' as that term is understood in the law of evidence."). Given the
linkage between discovery privilege and evidentiary privilege, it is understandable that courts
ready to deny discovery of tax returns state that no "absolute" privilege exists. See, e.g., Eastern
Auto Distribs. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., 96 F.R.D. 147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982) (noting that most
courts recognize only a "qualified" privilege against disclosure of tax returns).
82. Cf. EEOC v. University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d 331, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1983) (discusses
congressional policy behind Rule 501 before turning to discussion of claim that academic person-
nel files are subject to "qualified" discovery privilege).
83. Cf. Kirkland v. Morton Salt Co., 46 F.R.D. 28, 30 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (the rule of Hickman
v. Taylor created a "qualified immunity rather than a privilege" against discovery of a lawyer's
work product); City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.
1962) (the "work product" rule does not create a qualified privilege but is rather a requirement
that the party seeking discovery show "very good cause"). See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 50, § 2025 at 210-28.
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apt and have made a place for it in federal jurisprudence.84
The law of "qualified" privileges is new, tentative, and ill-defined.
The most significant federal case to establish a "qualified" privilege
was Hickman v. Taylor.85 In that case, the Supreme Court held that an
attorney enjoys a limited privilege in a given suit with respect to his
"work product" prepared for the litigation of that suit.86 One of the
underlying bases for the Court's holding was a recognition that free
access to an adversary attorney's files would encourage litigants to de-
fer preparation of their own cases, in the expectation of being able
inexpensively to take advantage of their adversaries' product in prepa-
ration for trial. 87 The rule of Hickman v. Taylor denies discovery of an
adversary's "work product" except upon a showing of need and inabil-
ity to obtain the information from other sources.8 8 The Court carefully
distinguished this protection of attorney work-product from the com-
mon law attorney-client privilege. 89
Since Hickman v. Taylor, federal courts have recognized other
claims of "qualified" privilege. Several circuits have agreed that news-
gatherers enjoy a "qualified" privilege against discovery of the identi-
ties of their confidential news sources.90 Other courts have recognized
a "qualified" privilege limiting discovery of grand jury testimony in
tangential proceedings. 9' Still other courts have approved a "quali-
fied" privilege protecting academic "peer review" voting on candidates
84. See, e.g., Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 356 (1979) (Rule 26(c)(7)
provides a "qualified privilege" for trade secrets); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-38
(1975) ("The privilege derived from the work product doctrine [may]... [ike other qualified
privileges ... be waived); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[O]ther privileges
... might be classified as qualified privileges [such as] the 'work product privilege.' "), cert. de-
nied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 435 (10th Cir. 1977) ("a
qualified privilege is in the process of developing").
85. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
86. Id at 508-10.
87. Id at 510-11; accordUnited States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 248 (1974) (White, J., concur-
ring) ("the danger perceived in Hickman [was] that each party to a case will decline to prepare in
the hopes of eventually using his adversary's preparation").
88. See Hickma,4 329 U.S. at 509-11. In 1970, the rule of Hickman v. Taylor was incorpo-
rated into the federal discovery rules. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 50, § 2023 at 193.
89. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
90. See, e.g., In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96 (Ist Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708,
715 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); Carey
v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir.), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545, 548-49 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
91. See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-24 (1979) (grand
jury transcripts discoverable only upon a showing of "particularized need" to avoid a "substantial
injustice"); Lucas v. Turner, 725 F.2d 1095, 1109 (7th Cir. 1984) (terms Douglas rule a "qualified"
discovery privilege).
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for tenure.92
These "qualified" privileges evolving in federal courts appear to
be characterized by two features: 1) once a source of information is
shown to fall within a category subject to the "qualified" privilege, the
opponent of discovery is deemed to have met his initial burden, under
rule 26(c), of showing "good cause" why discovery should not be had;
and, 2) information shown to fall within such a category is not discov-
erable until and unless the proponent of discovery can show: a) that
the information sought is needed; b) that it is relevant to the case; and,
c) that it is not reasonably available from alternative sources. 93
Three remarks need to be made about the "qualified" privileges.
First, the "qualified" privileges fit into the schema of the discovery
rules not as privileges in the full-blown sense-for if they did, of
course, they would be an insuperable barrier to discovery, absent
waiver-but as devices relieving the opponent of the initial burden of
showing "good cause."' 94 Second, although many courts have empha-
sized the "fact intensive" nature of the case-by-case development of the
law of privilege, the "qualified" privilege effectively relieves the oppo-
nent of his initial burden, under Rule 26, by showing that discovery
would expose him to "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or un-
due burden or expense." 95 Third, the showing of "need" and "rele-
92. See, ag., EEOC v. University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1983); Gray v.
Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 908 (2d Cir. 1982). Contra, In reDinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 430-
31 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to establish an evidentiary privilege to enable professor to withhold
information on how he voted on plaintiff's promotion to associate professor), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1106 (1982).
The terminology of "qualified" privilege has been used in other, more isolated cases. See,
e.g., United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("qualified" privilege protecting
police surveillance locations); Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600, 604-05
(5th Cir. 1966) ("qualified" privilege protecting "intra-agency correspondence discussing the
course of conduct to be followed by the parties [to an NLRB proceeding] and expressing opinions
as to the merits of various claims").
93. See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1980) (news-
man's confidential source discoverable by plaintiff only where such information is relevant, undis-
coverable by other means, and there is a "compelling interest"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981);
EEOC v. University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d 331, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1983) (identity of academic
"peer reviewers" in tenure decision is discoverable by an employment discrimination plaintiff only
upon a showing of "particularized need," i.e., that he has "conduct[ed a] thorough and exhaustive
[search of alternative sources] prior to seeking those materials protected by the qualified
privilege").
94. See EEOC v. University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d 331, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1983) ("because
we have held that the peer review materials are subject to a qualified privilege, it necessarily
follows that sufficient 'good cause' exists to protect these materials"); cf Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co.,
431 F.2d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1970) (where government asserts a novel privilege it should be consid-
ered "as part of the good cause requirement [of Rule 26(c), presumably] by balancing competing
policies.").
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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vance" to which the proponent of discovery is put seems to require a
sharp joinder of issues between the parties. The federal rules, however,
were initially intended to perform an "issue shaping" function, which
did not presuppose that the issues between the parties were set into
final form.96 Moreover, many decisions have distinguished the notion
of relevance that operates at trial from the looser notion of relevance
that is intended to govern the discovery stage.97 The point of these
remarks has been to indicate precisely how the "qualified" privileges fit
into the standard structure of the federal discovery rules and how they
alter that structure. It should also be noted that the "qualified" tax
return privilege expressed in the Cooper rule closely approximates the
structure of the other "qualified" federal discovery privileges.
The question arises, whether "qualified" discovery privileges are
to be established on grounds differing in any way from those upon
which the traditional "absolute" privileges have been raised. It could
96. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) ("The various instruments of discovery
serve... as a device... to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and... as a
device for ascertaining. . . the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues."); FED.
R. Civ. P. 8, 15(b); Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure I, 38 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1179, 1179-80 (1938) ("The new federal rules of civil procedure... [reflect] the newer
concept of 'notice pleading';... what have been thought to be the objects of pleading-the nar-
rowing of issues, the revelation of facts-will be served by several devices more precisely adapted
to their fulfillment [including] the ... completely renovated procedure for. . . discovery."). As
the liberal amendment provisions of Rule 15(b) suggest, facts revealed in the discovery process
will permit litigants to press issues not otherwise apparent in the pleadings, and press them against
persons not originally parties. See Bloomfield Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n., 519 F.2d 1257, 1262 (1975) ("The purpose of the rule is to
ameliorate the statute of limitation. . . where the [proper] party has had adequate notice of the
institution of the action.").
97. Once an objection of irrelevance is raised, the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery
to show that the matter sought is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation, but that burden is
little more than one of showing that there is some possibility that the matter sought will lead to
admissible evidence. United States v. International Business Mach., 66 F.R.D. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). But S( Home Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93, 101 (N.D. Ga. 1977) ("A general
allegation of relevancy is not sufficient to overcome specific objections by an adverse party."). The
Advisory Committee has noted that
Since decisions as to relevance to the subject matter of the action are made for discovery
purposes well in advance of trial, a flexible treatment of relevance is required and the
making of discovery, whether voluntary or under court order, is not a concession or
determination of relevance for purposes of trial.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee notes (1966 amendments).
The cases distinguish trial "relevance" and discovery "relevance to the subject matter." See,
eg., McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1979); FDIC v. Mercantile Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 84 F.R.D. 345, 348 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Moreover, courts have endorsed a willing-
ness to look beyond the pleadings to determine relevance to the subject matter of the litigation for
discovery purposes. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1187
(D.S.C. 1975) ("relevancy to the subject matter . . . is broader than relevancy to the issues




be argued that a lesser form of privilege requires a lesser degree of
justification, but to do so would be to slight the fact that privileges are
"strongly disfavored" 98 in federal practice: "Whatever their origin's
[whether constitutional, statutory, or common law], these exceptions to
the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expan-
siveo, construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."99
Not only is a "qualified" privilege an impediment to discovering
the truth, but circumstances will arise in which it is as formidable an
obstacle as an absolute privilege. Where a privileged document is a
summary of what may be volumes of other material, the process of
exhausting the alternative sources may exhaust a litigant's war chest as
well. 00 Cost factors aside, the "qualified" privileges deprive a litigant
of first-hand information. Should he obtain a passable facsimile sec-
ond hand, the party seeking discovery will be denied the first-hand ver-
sion and whatever leads or impeachable discrepancies it may
contain.' 0' "Qualified" privileges should be held to the same standard
ofjustification as absolute ones because, as a practical matter, there will
be cases in which they have an equivalent effect upon the outcome.
It might appear inconsistent to protect one category of evidence by
an absolute privilege while another category, having satisfied the same
standard, is protected by a mere "qualified" privilege. This inconsis-
tency is dispelled once one realizes that the inquiry into the appropri-
ateness of a special protection does not exhaust the further inquiry into
the proper extent of that protection. At common law, for example,
there is both an "absolute" spousal privilege and an "absolute" attor-
ney-client privilege. Nevertheless, the spousal privilege reaches all
communications between husband and wife,102 while only those com-
munications from client to attorney that arise from an actual or incipi-
ent representation are within the latter privilege.' 03 Common law
courts were no more irrational in creating such distinctions than federal
courts have been in creating a special class of "qualified" privileges. It
may be that federal courts have insisted upon the somewhat improper
98. ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1345 (5th Cir. 1981).
99. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1973) (emphasis added).
100. An egregious example is seen in Eastern Auto Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am.,
Inc., 96 F.R.D. 147 (E.D. Va. 1982), where the court referred the party seeking discovery of his
opponent's tax return to several alternative sources, the remotest of which was the files of the
French regulatory agency that oversees the operations of the Bourse. Id at 149 n.l.
101. See Rubenstein v. Klein, 21 F.R.D. 183, 184 (D. Mass. 1957) (tax returns held discovera-
ble for purposes of impeachment, where income is in issue).
102. See8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2232 at 225-26 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961).
103. Id § 2304 at 586 ("[Clommunications are protected, not merely when the person con-




terminology of privilege in these cases precisely because they do not
wish to exempt the "qualified" privileges from the rigorous threshold
justification traditionally required of privileges. 1°4
The courts that have created "qualified" privileges have not fol-
lowed a uniform path of analysis. Some courts have employed a test
balancing the policy interests served by limiting discovery against the
interest favoring the availability of "every man's evidence" in the ad-
versarial search for truth.10 5 Other courts have followed Wigmore's
classic formulation, which makes the existence of a confidential rela-
tion a predicate to the judicial creation of a privilege. 0 6 Significant
policies are at the root of both forms of analysis. Hickman v. Taylor
and the "qualified" privilege of grand jury testimony rest upon a judi-
cial concern for the protection of the integrity and functioning of the
judicial process itself. 07 The qualified "reporter's confidential source"
and "academic peer review" privileges rest upon a concern not to
"chill" the exercise of well-established constitutional liberties.10 8 A
"qualified" tax return privilege should be created only for substantial
reasons of comparable weight.
B. "Qualjled" Privileges and Income Tax Returns.
Many courts have been drawn to the idea of specially restricting
discovery of federal income tax returns. The variety of rationales and
outcomes found in the cases may suggest the early stages of the com-
mon law evolution of another important procedural safeguard. This
104. Cf Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholds the princi-
ple of a qualified "academic peer review" privilege, noting that "to sustain a privilege there must
be 'a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means
for ascertaining the truth." (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
105. See, e.g., Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1982) (in civil
rights actions, court employs balancing test in resolving tension between need for disclosure in
employment discrimination and need for confidentiality in academic tenure decisions).
106. See, e.g., Zaustinsky v. University of Cal., 96 F.R.D. 622, 624-25 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (quali-
fied "academic peer review" privilege applied); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 102, § 2285 at 527-28.
107. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1946) (policy underlying "work product"
rule is "essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure"); United States v. Sells
Eng'g., Inc., 103 S. Ct. 3133, 3138 (1983) (" 'We have consistently recognized that the proper
functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings."'
(quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979)); see also U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI (guarantees grand jury presentment prior to federal criminal prosecution).
108. SeeRegents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.") quotedin In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 430
(5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting claim of qualified "academic peer review" privilege), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) ("A re-
porter has a First Amendment privilege which protects the refusal to disclose the identity of confi-
dential informants; however, the privilege is not absolute."), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1981).
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variety 0 9 may also suggest, however, that a fundamental assumption of
the cases-the necessity of a tax return privilege granting more protec-
tion than the federal discovery rules-is incorrect.
Rule 26(c) provides that the court may, upon a showing of good
cause by the opponent of discovery, "make any order which justice re-
quires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression or undue burden or expense."110 Burdening the opponent
of discovery to show good cause why a protective order should issue is
consistent with the "broad and liberal treatment" accorded the federal
discovery rules. 111
The remainder of this note will review the policies advanced in
support of the "qualified" privilege doctrine as applied to tax returns.
Because courts have demonstrated an ability to fashion safeguards
under Rule 26(c) to protect the taxpayer from unnecessary discovery of
returns, the presumption is that, unless an overriding policy concern
exists, federal income tax returns are to be treated in the same way as
other financial documents and that motions to compel or to limit their
discovery should be treated according to the standard structure laid
down in Rules 34 and 26.
1. Taxpayer Compliance. Taxpayer compliance is the central
concern of most policies advanced today to support the "qualified" tax
109. Widely divergent results can be derived from a given factual setting under the Cooper
and the Kingsley rules. See generally supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text. Under Kingsley
the focus of inquiry is who, if anyone, raised the issue of income. Under Cooper the focus is upon
relevance and availability from other sources.
The cases that invoke both Kingsley and Cooper guidelines for analysis apply them either in
the alternative, e.g., Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 470 (D.D.C. 1977); see supra notes 75-76
and accompanying text; or engage in a balancing of factors drawn from the two, e.g., Smith v.
Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Thus far, the fact patterns tested under the "alter-
native" approach would have yielded an identical result under Cooper and Kingsley. The results
of the "balancing" approach are difficult to characterize, but whenever the party resisting discov-
ery seems even remotely to have tendered the issue of his income, discovery is allowed. See, e.g.,
Bader, 83 F.R.D. at 438-39 (plaintiffs deemed to have placed their income in issue by claiming
that they suffered a loss due to the defendants' alleged securities violations); Mitsui & Co. v.
Puerto Rico Water Resources, 79 F.R.D. 72, 81 (D.P.R. 1978) (plaintiffs place income in issue by
claiming losses for alleged breach of contract).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Where an objection to discovery has been raised, some courts have
ordered production but kept the tax return under seal. Credit Life Ins. Co. v. Uniworld Ins. Co.,
94 F.R.D. 113, 121 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624, 627
(S.D. Fla. 1977). Another court has found privacy concerns satisfied by the discovering party's
offer to stipulate to an order of confidentiality. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). Still another court has limited production to specific portions of the tax return. See Taylor
v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 33 F.R.D. 283, 286 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Developments in the Law,
supra note 43, at 1011-12.
Ill. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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return privilege. '1 2 The success of our "self-assessment" system of tax-
ation depends upon a high degree of voluntary taxpayer compliance
and some courts fear that "routine" discovery of tax return information
will discourage complete disclosure.
Courts invoking the policy of fostering compliance seldom treat it
as an end in itself. Taxpayer filing of complete and accurate returns is
important because it is instrumental to the further policy goal of maxi-
mizing federal revenue.113 One court has identified an independent
policy goal favoring the use by taxpayers of all the deductions to which
they are entitled.1 4 Recent cases, however, have singled out the inter-
est in the filing of complete and accurate returns of losses and deduc-
tions as not warranting a restriction of discovery of tax returns." 5
These cases rest upon the commonsense notion that a taxpayer has a
sufficiently great incentive, derived from the prospect of tax savings, to
report fully his "tax losses and tax shelters." 16 This incentive exists
wholly apart from any expectation that tax information will be ex-
empted from discovery in civil litigation.
Most courts recently endorsing the "qualified" privilege have been
guided by the argument that "routine" discovery of tax returns in pri-
vate civil litigation will have the effect of impairing the collection of
federal revenues. This reasoning is not consistent with the federal judi-
ciary's typical deference to Congress where revenue policy is at issue"17
112. See infra note 126; see also Tele-Radio Sys., Ltd. v. DeForest Elecs., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 371,
375 (D.NJ. 1981) ("'Public policy against unnecessary public disclosure arises from the need...
to encourage taxpayers to fie complete and accurate returns."' (quoting Premium Serv. Co. v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1975)); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("public interest in encouraging the filing by taxpayers of complete and accurate
returns"); Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 234 (D.D.C. 1978) ("the fear of
public disclosure might. . . hinder the 'full disclosure of all the taxpayer's income which thereby
maximizes revenue,'" (quoting Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 512, 514
(N.D. 111. 1972)); Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 469 (D.D.C. 1977) (without assurance of confi-
dentiality, reporting of all taxable income will be discouraged); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v.
Kreuger, 55 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (full disclosure is furthered by a policy of
confidentiality).
113. See supra note 112; infra note 137.
114. Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 469 (D.D.C. 1977).
115. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. at 439; Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 234
(D.D.C. 1978).
116. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. at 439; Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 234
(D.D.C. 1978).
117. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495, 1505 (1984) (reversing the
Second Circuit, which had created a "qualified" privilege for tax accrual workpapers: "This kind
of policy choice [involving balancing of competing interests] is best left to the Legislative
Branch."); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967) ("[W]e do not sit as a committee
of revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commis-
sioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing 'all needful rules and regulations for the enforce-
ment' of the. . . Code." (citation omitted)); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir.
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and it is vulnerable to another very strong-if obvious-objection. A
great deal of income information is supplied to the government both by
the taxpayer and by the income source, e.g., an employer or a financial
institution."" It is unlikely that the distant prospect of civil discovery
will influence a reasonable taxpayer to withhold from the government
income information it will routinely receive from another source. Full
taxpayer reporting of income from tips or rent, which is not reported to
the government by its source, could conceivably be compromised. The
likelihood of this is minimal, however, because the benefit of not hav-
ing to disclose tax return information if a civil suit materializes hardly
seems to outweigh the risks inherent in violating the tax laws."t9 Even
if revenue maximizing were a proper and significant judicial concern,
1978) ("These cases [finding a 'self-evaluative report' privilege] arose in the course of discovery
where the Rules of Civil Procedure leave much to the judge's discretion. With respect to enforce-
ment of the tax laws, Congress itself has decided the policy issue, and it is not for the courts to
challenge that determination. In this, as in many other procedural questions, the collection of
revenue stands apart." (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoborow Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 282 (1856))). But see United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1973)
("work product" doctrine held applicable to a proceeding for enforcement of an IRS summons).
118. According to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the IRS annually collects two bil-
lion dollars in taxes on unreported income by "matching" third-party reports on such items as
wages, interest, dividends, securities and retirement account transactions with the taxpayers' item-
ized returns "or the lack of returns." Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
119. SeeDevelopments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1010-12. "Chilling effect" arguments have
been made in recent cases touching upon other areas of tax administration. In United States v.
King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (Weinstein, J.), the City of New York, arguing privi-
lege, moved to quash a subpoena that had been issued for the original city tax return of the
defendant in a criminal tax fraud prosecution. The court's inquiry concerned the "chilling" effect
upon income reporting that the city alleged would result if the court subscribed to a policy of
enforcing such subpoenas. The court found that the confidentiality provisions of the city income
tax statute represented a "relatively weak policy" in that the statute provided for reciprocal ex-
changes of individual tax return information with other taxing authorities for purposes of tax
enforcement. Id at 108. The court wrote:
Honest reporting by city taxpayers is induced chiefly by reliance on criminal statutes,
cooperation with other taxing authorities and techniques for withholding taxes at the
source as well as by other devices. We take judicial notice that such programs are im-
measurably more effective than are privilege provisions as means to the ends sought by
the City. The privilege is relied upon only as a peripheral inducement to voluntary dec-
laration of tax liability to the City.
Id (citation omitted). The court found that a balancing of factors favored enforcement of the
subpoena, in that the "most powerful and least variable" of the factors-the need to put all rele-
vant evidence before the trier of fact-cearly outweighed what was "at most, an insignificant
adverse impact upon a state policy that is, at best, marginally served by the local statutory scheme
of limited confidentiality." Id at 105, 109. The motion to quash was accordingly denied.
The King analysis has been criticized. See In re Cruz, 561 F. Supp. 1042, 1043-45 (D. Conn.
1983). There, the court ordered the quashing of a subpoena of state tax files issued by a federal
grand jury. King was distinguished on the ground that it had preceded the passage of the 1976
Tax Reform Act, and that I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1), as amended, controlled the procedures for subpoena
of tax returns in nontax criminal investigations. Id at 1044-45. The court, reasoning by analogy,
held that the procedures set out in § 6103(i)(1) control equally where a federal grand jury seeks to
subpoena state income tax returns. Id at 1045-46.
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there is no reason that the protective devices of Rule 26 should be less
effective in service of that concern than a "qualified" discovery
privilege.
2. Privacy and Confidentiality. In Heathman v. United States
District Court,'2 0 the Ninth Circuit held that the taxpayer's interest in
the privacy of his federal return was not within the protection of the
Constitution. The court found "no merit" in the defendants' conten-
tion that discovery of their federal tax returns would violate their con-
stitutional right to privacy or their fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 121 The absence of a constitu-
tional basis, however, does not mean that the taxpayer's privacy inter-
est is negligible or unworthy of judicial concern, 122 although it is not
The provisions of I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1), which pertain to nontax criminal investigations, require
government prosecutors to make a showing of need before an ex parte subpoena will issue. The
showing required is that:
(i) there is reasonable cause to believe ... that a specific criminal act has been commit-
ted; (ii) there is reason to believe that such return or return information is probative
evidence [regarding] . . . the criminal act; and (iii) the information sought to be dis-
closed cannot reasonably be obtained from any other source, unless. . . [it] constitutes
the most probative evidence of a matter in issue relating to. . . such criminal act.
I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (1982) (emphasis added).
A comparison between this provision and the "qualified" tax return privilege in civil discov-
ery is instructive. The provision parallels the structure of the new "qualified" privileges, except
that it provides for subpoena where the tax return is the most probative evidence on a matter in
issue, and in such circumstances the subpoena will issue whether or not the information is other-
wise available. Therefore, the § 6103(i)(1)(B) provision is significantly less restrictive than its judi-
cially created counterpart, the Cooper rule. A public policy favoring crime control might arguably
justify this asymmetry. Yet, on the other hand, the ex parte nature of the procedure governed by
§ 6103(i)(l)(B), and the fact that few private litigants enjoy the tremendous resources of the state,
argue for allowing the private litigant greater freedom of discovery in order to prepare his case.
In the case of United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd in
pertinent part, 104 S. Ct. 1495, 1502-05 (1984), the Second Circuit created a Hickman v. Taylor-
style work-product privilege for tax accrual workpapers supplied by a client to his accountant for
the purpose of preparing filings to comply with federal securities laws. The Second Circuit relied
heavily upon a "chilling effect" rationale. Had it been upheld, Arthur Young would have been a
departure from a considerable body of precedent holding that no accountant-client privilege exists
in federal courts, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973), except in diversity cases where
substantive state law applies such a privilege, e.g., Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir.
1955). The Supreme Court reversed, however, opining that balancing the goal of fair and honest
securities markets against the "chilling effect" of IRS subpoena power was a matter for congres-
sional decision. United States v. Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. 1495, 1502, 1505 (1984).
120. 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1974) (relying upon Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
335-36 (1973) (holding that there is "no semblance of governmental compulsion" where IRS seeks
to enforce a subpoena of tax-related documents in the possession of the taxpayer's accountant)).
121. Heathman, 503 F.2d at 1035.
122. The Advisory Committee noted that "a party's income tax return is generally held not
privileged.. . and yet courts have recognized that interests in privacy may call for a measure of
extra protection." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee note (1970 amendment) (citing Wie-
senberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)).
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clear why this interest is of greater concern than the taxpayer's privacy
interest in other financial documents that contain equivalent informa-
tion. 23 In many of the cases that accord tax returns a "qualified" privi-
lege, the court has encouraged the party seeking discovery to locate the
information he desires among other financial documents available
from his adversary. 124 This approach does not seem to be internally
consistent if the privacy interest inheres in the information itself, rather
than in the form in which that information is recorded.
It could be argued that there is an important difference between
data that an individual voluntarily collects for his own reasons and
data that an individual is forced to collect, transcribe, and file with the
government under threat of civil and criminal penalties. The difference
is that in the latter case, unlike the former, there is a degree of govern-
mental intrusion that is in itself offensive to privacy whether or not the
data is later disclosed. This aggravated intrusion, therefore, justifies
special treatment of the tax return. But this argument would success-
fully distinguish discovery of tax returns from discovery of equivalent
information not fied on a tax return only if the imposition of a legal
duty to fie a tax return were itself an invasion of legitimate privacy
rights. No court has shown such extreme deference to privacy inter-
ests, 125 however, even where the privilege against self-incrimination has
123. Judge Aldrich, ruling on a motion to compel production of tax returns, wrote:
If the plaintiff had a complete set of books and records which showed the figures that
went into his returns, no one would say that he could not be ordered to produce them.
The same information does not, unless the statute is very explicit, become any the less
obtainable just because the plaintiff has written it down on a governmental form.
Tollefsen v. Phillips, 16 F.R.D. 348, 349 (D. Mass. 1954).
124. See, e.g., Eastern Auto Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., 96 F.R.D. 147, 149 & n.1
(E.D. Va. 1982) (periodic reports filed with the Commission des Operations de Bourse; official
French commercial newspapers; opponent's annual reports); Tele-Radio Sys., Ltd. v. DeForest
Elecs., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 371, 374 n.l, 375 (D.N.J. 1981) (corporate minute book, stock book, stock
transfer ledger, year-end financial statements, purchase orders, invoices, acknowledgments, ship-
ping documents, warranty documents, payment records, sales ledgers, bills of materials, "and the
like"); cf. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1975) ("Although such investigations
[under IRS's § 7602 subpoena power] unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy,. . . the
alternatives could well involve far less agreeable invasions of house, business, and records.").
125. The constitutional right of privacy exists in the "emanations" of the "penumbra" sur-
rounding the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965). Of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, only the fourth and fifth amendments
appear to have been urged as grounds for restricting access by legal process to tax return informa-
tion. See supra note 121 and accompanying text; infra note 126 and accompanying text.
Although the states that have enacted an income tax have, without exception, made some
provision for the confidentiality of tax return information, such provisions have been held not to
derogate the reach of the subpoena power of federal courts in criminal cases. See United States v.
King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 109 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (city confidentiality statute held not to insulate state tax
returns from subpoena by federal prosecutor). See generally Note, Raiding the Confessional-The
Use of Income Tax Returns in Non/ax Criminal Investigations, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1251, 1252 &
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGES
been implicated. 126
Another dimension of the right of privacy has to do with confiden-
tial relationships, e.g., with a minister, a physician, a legal counselor, a
spouse. To the extent that our legal system values and seeks to foster
such relationships, the communications essential to the development of
these relationships are privileged in both the law of discovery 127 and of
evidence. 128 The protection of certain confidential relationships has in
fact been the keynote of privilege law. In Wigmore's classic formula-
tion, a privilege should be recognized only where the following four
conditions are met:
(1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed;
(2) the element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the commu-
nity ought to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation.129
The relation between taxpayer and tax collector does not appear to
satisfy Wigmore's first condition. A taxpayer's communications with
the IRS arise from a legal duty to report income. 130 A taxpayer has no
assurance that his tax return will not be passed to another agency of the
federal government' 3' or of a state132 to be used to investigate his possi-
ble civil or criminal liability under tax or nontax law, and of course he
has no assurance that his tax return will not be used against him in
court by a governmental adversary. 33 The circulation of the tax return
n.l (1980). But G( FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing that state privilege law will prevail in civil
diversity cases, with respect to issues for which state law provides the "rule of decision").
126. Compare United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927) ("If the form of return pro-
vided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised
them on the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all."), with
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1967) (holding that the fifth amendment excused
professional gambler from filing an occupational tax return, every portion of which, unlike the
income tax return in question in United States v. Sullivan, "had the direct and unmistakable conse-
quence of incriminating petitioner"). The cases agree that the factor that triggers the privilege
against self-incrimination is not the degree of sensitivity of the information required by the Tax
Code, but rather it is the reasonable likelihood that disclosure will result in a criminal penalty.
See United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 n.8 (1984) (no "zone of privacy" protects personal
papers absent a showing of compulsion).
127. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 200-02 (1978).
128. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 102, § 2285 at 527-28.
129. Id (emphasis in original).
130. I.R.C. §§ 6651, 7201-7207 (1982).
131. I.R.C. § 6103(h)(2)(A) (1982). See generally Benedict & Lupert, supra note 6, at 952-77.
132. I.R.C. § 6103(d) (1982). See generally Benedict & Lupert, supra note 6, at 970-77.
133. I.R.C. § 6103(h)-(i) (1982).
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through these channels is not subject to the taxpayer's disapproval, and
the bureaus that come into possession of the information may well be
legal adversaries of the taxpayer. Therefore, it is impossible to main-
tain that the filing of a tax return is a communication that originates in
a confidence that the information on the return will not be disclosed.
In Lord Eldon's phrase, "[t]he moment confidence ceases, privilege
ceases."1 34 The taxpayer will of course not expect his tax return to be
grossly abused, but this expectation of confidentiality is not markedly
greater than that which resides in dozens of kinds of everyday relation-
ships that have never been candidates for privileged status. 135
Wigmore's second and fourth conditions both call for an assess-
ment of the typical consequences of disclosure. The second condition
requires that confidentiality "be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance" of the relationship in question. A showing of "essential-
ity" presumably would consist in a showing that damage to the relation
would result from the relaxation of confidentiality, i.e., from disclosure.
The fourth condition calls for a balancing of the resultant injury to the
relation from disclosure against the good which disclosure would work
in advancing the interests ofjustice. Because balancing calls for at least
a rough assessment of the harm disclosure would do to the relation,
both the second and the fourth Wigmore conditions call for the propo-
nent of a privilege to show that the denial of the privilege would dimin-
ish confidentiality in such a way as to damage the relation. Because
privileges are "not lightly [to be] created,"' 136 the proponent of the priv-
ilege should also show that this damage is appreciable in degree. The
question arises, how to measure the degree of damage to the taxpayer-
tax collector relation? The cases137 strongly suggest that the proper
134. Pankhurst v. Lowten, 36 Eng. Rep. 59, 2 Swans. 194, 216 (1819); see United States v.
Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 (5th Cir. 1981) ("federal and state tax returns and other reports filed
with the government . . . are not confidential communications and hence are not privileged"
under attorney-client privilege); see also Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) ("a good deal of information transmitted to an attorney by
a client is not intended to be confidential, but rather is given for transmittal by the attorney to
others-for inclusion in the tax return. Such information is, of course,. . . not privileged.").
135. No one would expect his disclosures to a lending institution, made in support of a loan
application, to be publicized without his permission. Nevertheless, the borrower/lender relation
does not come within any recognized privilege.
136. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1973).
137. See, e.g., Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir.
1975) ("A public policy against unnecessary public disclosure arises from the need, if the tax laws
are to function properly, to encourage taxpayers to file complete and accurate returns."); Heath-
man v. United States Dist. Ct., 503 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1974) (Chambers, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("Because of our system of taxation through self-assessment, the maximization of fed-
eral revenue hinges on complete and detailed reporting by each taxpayer. Such reporting is in a
large part nourished by the confidential nature of the tax returns.").
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measure is the degree of voluntary taxpayer compliance with the tax
laws. The effect of the threat of disclosure of tax return information in
private nontax civil litigation upon taxpayer compliance was examined
in the preceding section. If the conclusion reached there, that the effect
is de minimis, is correct, then the "qualified" privilege also fails to sat-
isfy either the second or the fourth of Wigmore's conditions.
It is more difficult to say whether the taxpayer-tax collector rela-
tion satisfies Wigmore's third condition. The traditionally privileged
relations-attorney-client, husband-wife, physician-patient-are typi-
cally personal, face-to-face relationships in which one party entrusts
the protection of his interests to the other. Some courts have been re-
luctant to extend a privilege to relationships that are indirect or fleet-
ing. 38 Other courts, however, have regarded "encouraging the
voluntary filing of certain records" as on a par with "fostering relation-
ships" for purposes of applying Wigmore's third condition. 139 The re-
lation between taxpayer and tax collector is typically impersonal and,
where personal, it is adversarial. Although this fact may not entirely
remove the taxpayer-tax collector relation from the scope of the tradi-
tional privileges, it does distinguish that relation from the paradigm
examples.
III. CONCLUSION
More than forty years have passed since a federal court first denied
discovery of a tax return on grounds of privilege. Yet subsequent deci-
sions have sharply divided on the issue of the existence of even a "qual-
ified" form of privilege, and the courts that have upheld the "qualified"
privilege have not succeeded in reducing it to a univocal rule. Scant
support for the "qualified" privilege doctrine is to be found in the tax
code, the treasury regulations, the Constitution, or the common law.
As their designation suggests, the federal discovery rules are in-
tended to expedite the search for truth. The implementation of the dis-
covery rules necessarily affects other policy concerns, and where these
other concerns are of overriding strength, the discovery rules must
138. See In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d Cir. 1983) (no psychotherapist-patient privilege
because Wigmore's third condition not satisfied; "hardly any relationship of trust" arose due to
this specific psychotherapist's "assembly-line technique"); FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d
731,734 (7th Cir. 1962) ("We are not persuaded that the relationships between several members of
a trade association and the association accountant should be considered a relationship equally
valued, for the same reason, as the personal relationship between husband and wife, priest and
penitant, [or] physician and patient.").
139. In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1976). Wigmore
himself brought the "informer's" privilege within his general analysis. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
102, § 2285 at 528.
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yield. Even so, the discovery rules have built into their structure a
mechanism to protect litigants against the most common forms of dis-
covery abuse. This structure places the burden of persuasion upon the
opponent of discovery-he must show that "good cause" exists for the
court to protect him against embarrassment or harassment. Federal
courts should abandon this structure only grudgingly. The adoption of
a "qualified" discovery privilege shifts the burden of persuasion onto
the party seeking discovery. A "qualified" discovery privilege is a
deviation from the standard structure of pretrial discovery that can be
justified only by reference to policy concerns that the standard struc-
ture fails to satisfy.
Two policy concerns lie at the core of the decisions favoring a
"qualified" tax return privilege. The first, privacy, does not justify
preferential treatment of tax returns as against other documents bear-
ing equivalent information, but no court has extended a "qualified"
privilege to any financial document other than the tax return itself.
Moreover, the "qualified" tax return privilege fails to satisfy Wigmore's
prerequisites to the extra-statutory creation of a privilege. The second
policy ground, here called "revenue maximizing," has become the ma-
jor underpinning of the "qualified" privilege doctrine. The "revenue
maximizing" rationale is not persuasive, however, because the impact
of discovery conducted within the standard structure upon taxpayer
compliance is speculative and would be minimal if actual. In addition,
the "revenue maximizing" rationale does not sit comfortably with the
well-settled judicial posture of deference to Congress where matters of
revenue are at issue.
The argument for a "qualified" tax return privilege fails even if
these policy grounds are conceded, however, because no showing can
be made that the standard structure operates to their detriment. The
efforts to frame a "qualified" tax return privilege represent a confusing
and inadequately motivated departure from the standard structure of
pretrial discovery. The "qualified" tax return privilege is therefore an
unnecessary and undesirable barrier to what will often be the most pro-
bative, most concise, and the most easily intelligible source of otherwise
discoverable evidence or leads to evidence.
William A. Edmundson
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